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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this article is to further our understanding of the “GM is unnatural” view, 
and of the critical response to it. While many people have been reported to hold the 
view that GM is unnatural, many policy-makers and their advisors have suggested 
that the view must be ignored or rejected, and that there are scientific reasons for 
doing so. Three “typical” examples of ways in which the “GM is unnatural” view has 
been treated by UK policy-makers and their advisors are explored. These are: the 
Government’s position (DEFRA Report), the account of the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, and the position of Nigel Halford, a scientist with an advisory role to the 
Government. I show that their accounts fail to mount a convincing critique. Then, I 
draw on an empirical research project held during 2003-2004 at the University of 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north east of England. Scientists met with non-scientists 
in a range of facilitated one-to-one conversations (“exchanges”) on various 
environmental issues, one of which was on GM. Our findings show that some 
scientists who rejected the “GM is unnatural” view struggled to do so consistently. 
Their struggle is interpreted in terms of a conflict between a so-called “scientific” 
worldview, and a different worldview that underlies the concerns of those who held 
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the “GM is unnatural” view. This worldview is explored further by an examination of 
their concerns. What distinguishes this worldview from the “scientific” worldview is 
that the instrumentalisation of the nonhuman world is questioned to a larger extent. I 
conclude that, because the underlying concerns of those who held the “GM is 
unnatural” view were not with GM as such, yet with a worldview which was 
considered to be problematic, and of which many GM applications were held to be 
expressions, policy-makers and their advisors should reflect on the critical worldview 
of those who claim that GM is unnatural if they want to engage seriously with their 
concerns. 
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Are Scientists Right and Non-Scientists Wrong?  
Reflections on Discussions of GM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Opponents of genetic modification technology (GM) have frequently argued that GM 
is unnatural. Research suggests that this is a very common view among the public in 
many countries, including the UK. Those who hold the view also use words like 
“tampering”, “messing”, or “muddling” with nature when they express their 
objections to GM. Their belief is that GM alters nature radically, and that such 
alterations are problematic. However, the “GM is unnatural” view has been widely 
criticised. The key objection is that the claim that GM is unnatural must be 
meaningless as defining what is “natural/unnatural” would not be possible. Cooley 
and Goreham, for example, write: “Given the difficulty in discovering a plausible 
definition of ‘unnatural’, if we truly desire to make headway with the moral issue of 
transgenic organisms, we might have to stop spending time on the ‘unnatural is 
unethical’ argument and seek better arguments” (2004, p. 54). In the UK, many 
 3 
policy-makers and their advisors seem especially keen to ignore or dismiss the “GM 
is unnatural” view. The critics of the “GM is unnatural” view also claim to have 
“scientists” on their side: “(the) ‘natural/unnatural’ distinction is one of which few 
practising scientists can make much sense” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1999, p. 
15 par. 1.40). This apparent division between scientists’ and non-scientists’ 
perceptions is usually attributed to the “public’s” - that is: the non-scientists’ - lack of 
understanding of GM. If they understood the technology better, they wouldn’t oppose 
it. Evidence from recent studies suggests that this is not true. Concerns about the 
unnaturalness of GM do not go away as people learn more about the technology.  
However, criticisms of the “GM is unnatural” view are equally persistent. 
The aim of this article is to improve our understanding of the “GM is 
unnatural” view and the critical objections to it. I draw on the views of a small group 
of scientists and non-scientists who participated in a recent research project, 
conducted in Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north east of England. The project 
complements other studies in two respects. Firstly, the participants met in facilitated 
one-to-one meetings (or “exchanges”) involving one academic scientist and one non-
scientist recruited from the local community. Each participant took part in a series of 
these meetings, in which they discussed different environmental issues, including one 
on GM. If scientists’ and non-scientists’ perceptions of the “GM is unnatural” view 
are very different, we should see this quite clearly in the exchanges. Secondly, the 
participating scientists were not GM experts but came from a range of (environment-
related) disciplines. If it is correct that “scientists”, and not only those scientists 
working on GM, do not accept the “natural/unnatural” distinction, we should see this 
critical view among our scientists. We found that the views expressed by our 
participants did not reveal this simple division between scientists and non-scientists. 
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Instead, we found that the positions of both groups (even in our very small project) 
were more complex and varied. By analysing their views, I hope to provide important 
insights into both the “GM is unnatural” view and the critical response to it.  
In the first section, I present three “typical” examples of ways in which the 
“GM is unnatural” view has been treated by UK policy-makers and their advisors. In 
the second section, I introduce our empirical study in further detail. The positions of 
two scientists who rejected the “GM is unnatural” view are presented as case studies 
of different perspectives on this view in the third section. The data received provide 
important clues to why many scientists may hold the view, and how they struggle to 
maintain it. One scientist, however, strongly endorsed the “GM is unnatural” view. In 
the fourth section, his views are explored as a rare case study of a scientist who 
expressed a number of concerns related to the process, the outcome, and the attitudes 
of those involved with GM. His account is complemented with the views of other 
scientists and non-scientists who expressed similar concerns. Their accounts are 
suggestive of an underlying worldview which is generally inconsistent with the 
development of GM technology. In the fifth section, I note that all of our participants 
expressed some support for some GM applications, and I reject the suggestion that 
this is inconsistent with the “GM is unnatural” view. In the sixth section, I explore the 
wider unease that our participants showed with a range of other technologies and 
practices, and I interpret this as a sign that concerns about GM reflect a concern with 
an underlying worldview.  
 
UK POLITICS AND THE “GM IS UNNATURAL” VIEW 
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A number of UK policy-makers and policy advisors have ignored or rejected the “GM 
is unnatural” view. I shall briefly discuss three examples of how this has been done. 
These are: the Government’s account (DEFRA Report), the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics’ account, and the position of Nigel Halford, a scientist at Rothamsted 
Research, UK, who also has an advisory role to the Government. 
In the Government’s Report “The GM Dialogue: Government Response”, the 
Government responds to the findings of the GM dialogue announced by the Secretary 
of State in 2002 (DEFRA, 2004). The dialogue was sponsored by the UK Government 
and the devolved administrations and aimed to foster mutual understanding between 
people with different views on GM, to enlarge public understanding of the issues, and 
to gather further evidence that could be used by Government to make decisions. The 
dialogue comprised three main strands: a science review (conducted by a panel of 
independent scientists chaired by the Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor working 
with DEFRA’s Chief Scientist), a costs and benefits study (by the Government’s 
Strategy Unit), and a nation-wide public debate on GM, later referred to as “GM 
Nation” (managed by an independent steering board).  
In its “Response”, the Government evaluates and endorses the Strategy Unit’s 
conclusion that future developments in GM crops could offer more significant 
benefits than existing GM crops for UK farmers. The Government suggests that “the 
responsible development of GM crop technology could offer significant potential 
benefits in the UK and globally, including to developing countries” (2004, pp. 28-29 
par. 5.62 and 5.64). However, the Government does not engage with the GM public 
debate’s finding that there are people who think that humans should not use GM 
technology to change nature. Instead, the Report simply quotes from the GM Nation 
Report by stating that many “people suggest that the human species has no right to 
 6 
use GM technology to alter the course of nature” (2004, p. 29 par. 5.64; GM Public 
Debate Steering Board, 2003, p. 21). While the Government comments on other parts 
of the GM Nation Report, from which it quotes extensively, no comment is made on 
the “GM is unnatural” view. This suggests that the Government judges that the 
concerns of those who hold the “GM is unnatural” view do not outweigh the 
“significant potential benefits” which GM could offer.1 This interpretation is further 
supported by the Government’s apparent endorsement of the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics’ conclusion that “there is an ethical obligation to explore these potential 
benefits responsibly, in order to contribute to the reduction of poverty and to improve 
food security and profitable agriculture in developing countries” (2004, p. 30 par. 5.65 
and p. 7 Executive Summary 25). The lack of attention given to the views of those 
who think GM might constitute an illegitimate interference with the order of nature 
creates the impression that they are considered to be irrelevant, or that they would 
vanish once people learned more about the “significant potential benefits”.  
While the DEFRA Report does not examine the claims made by those who 
hold the “GM is unnatural” view, it refers approvingly to the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics. The Council, which is an independent organisation, is held in high regard 
by Government, providing advice on ethical matters. It has published two reports on 
GM and examines the “GM is unnatural” view in both. In its first Report, the Council 
claims that the “‘natural/unnatural’ distinction is one of which few practising 
                                                 
1
 In the executive summary of the “Response”, the Government writes: “We recognise that people have 
legitimate concerns about GM crops. Nevertheless, we believe that the responsible development of GM 
crop technology could offer significant potential benefits both in the UK and globally” (DEFRA, 2004, 
p. 7 Executive Summary 25). 
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scientists can make much sense” (1999, p. 15 par. 1.40). The Council elaborates on its 
critique in its second Report:  
“Conventional plant breeding is often understood as the selection of particular individuals from a great 
variety of naturally occurring types of plants (and) tends to be seen as natural. However, plant breeders 
also create plants which would not be achievable by judicious interbreeding, using techniques such as 
wide-crossing. … Another technique, mutation breeding, involves the exposure of plants and seeds to 
radiation and chemical substances. … Thus, it is important to note that the deliberate alteration of 
plants as they occur in nature has been practised and accepted for several decades. In this context, 
genetic modification can be seen as a new means to achieve the same end; it is certainly used in that 
way. It differs from conventional plant breeding in that it can allow for much faster and more precise 
ways of producing improved crops. For this reason, we concluded in our 1999 Report that it was not 
helpful to classify a crop that has been arrived at by means of conventional plant breeding as “natural”, 
and to classify a crop with the same genetic complement as “unnatural” if it has been produced through 
genetic modification” (2003, p. 24 par. 3.8). 
While the Council’s explicitly stated purpose is to object to the making of any 
distinction between what is “natural” and what is “unnatural” (and to close the door 
on those who claim that GM is problematic because of its unnaturalness), the 
distinction sneaks in through the back door when it distinguishes “plants as they occur 
in nature” from plants created by “deliberate alteration”. The Council appears to 
concede that some things might be more natural than others. While the Council may 
still hold that the view that what is unnatural is unethical is flawed, it implicitly grants 
that the reason for this may not be related to problems with defining 
“naturalness/unnaturalness”. In spite of the Council’s claims, what the Council really 
argues is not that there is no boundary between the natural and the unnatural, but that 
the introduction of GM science does not mark the point where the boundary between 
the natural and the unnatural has been crossed. The argument is then that because 
some other technologies, such as wide crossing and mutation breeding, have been 
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“practised and accepted for several decades”, GM may not be different from these 
technologies insofar as the naturalness-unnaturalness issue is concerned, and therefore 
cannot be rejected on this basis.  
Three objections must be raised. Firstly, when the Council writes that 
“deliberate alteration of plants … has been practised and accepted”, the impression is 
created that all other methods of alteration are accepted by everyone, and the 
possibility is ignored that some people may have objections to some or all methods of 
alteration. Secondly, the Council’s view is that these methods are acceptable because 
they are accepted, yet one could object that not all things which are accepted are 
acceptable. And thirdly, as the argument presupposes that a distinction between “the 
natural” and “the unnatural” can be made, the Council should acknowledge that a 
debate can be held about where the boundary should lie, rather than suggest that such 
a debate would be meaningless.2     
A third critic of the “GM is unnatural” view is Nigel Halford, who works at 
Rothamsted Research, the largest agricultural research centre in the UK. Halford has 
been involved with the genetic modification of plants, including a field trial on GM 
wheat. He is a member of the Advisory Committee on Animal Feedingstuffs which 
provides advice to DEFRA and the devolved administrations on the safety of animal 
feeds and feeding practices, and a former panel member of CropGen, a pro-GM lobby 
group. I have chosen to comment on Halford’s position as he has, unlike many other 
scientists, published his views on GM and presented his arguments at a significant 
number of public meetings (2003, p. vi). Halford develops his critique in response to 
Prince Charles, “who has been quoted as saying” that “mixing genetic material from 
                                                 
2
 The Council claims not only that most scientists would agree that the debate is meaningless, yet also 
that “the decision about what is unnatural cannot be one for public policy” (1999, p. 17 par. 1.51).  
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species that cannot breed naturally, takes us into areas that should be left to God” 
(2003, p. 83). Halford offers three criticisms. Firstly, he argues that “mixing genetic 
material from sexually incompatible species” has been going on for a long time by 
means of other techniques which are now “accepted readily” (2003, p. 16, p. 83). 
Halford refers to triticale as an example, which is the product of forced crossing 
between wheat and rye, and the production of which necessitated chemical treatment 
to overcome the problem of wheat and rye chromosomes not pairing (2003, p. 83, p. 
15).3 Triticale has been commercialised since 1969. Secondly, he claims that “the 
species alive today are part of an evolutionary continuum, not separate entities (…). 
So how can it be fundamentally wrong to move genes between species?” And finally, 
Halford claims that the important question is not where a gene comes from or how it 
gets there, but “what it does”. He argues that “a gene producing a poison … crossed 
into a crop plant from a wild relative is clearly much more dangerous than a gene 
producing a benign protein that is introduced into a crop plant by genetic 
modification” (2003, p. 83). 
All of Halford’s arguments are problematic. The problem with his first 
argument is, as mentioned in the context of discussing the Nuffield Council’s 
position, that it overlooks the possibility that those who oppose GM because it is 
unnatural might also have problems with other technologies, such as forced crossing.  
Halford assumes that these other technologies are “accepted readily” by everyone but 
does not offer any evidence to support this assumption. Indeed, we might wonder how 
                                                 
3
 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics also uses the example of triticale in the context of comparing 
conventional methods and GM, and in the context of making the argument that “to the plant breeder, 
genetic modification is simply the latest technology which breeders hope to bring to bear in their quest 
for ever-improved crops” (1999, p. 21 pars. 2.6 and 2.7.) 
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many people know about forced crossing and mutation breeding. The reason why not 
many people have questioned these technologies may simply be that not many people 
know about them, rather than that they are “accepted readily”. Halford’s second 
criticism is incomplete. The view that all species are related is a scientific theory. The 
essence of this theory is that the boundaries between species are fluid, rather than 
fixed. What it does not establish, however, is the alleged implication that shifting 
genes between species is acceptable. An argument to explain why the former 
(scientific) view should lead to the latter (moral) view is lacking. Halford’s final 
criticism conflates human and nonhuman causation. If a stone falls off a mountain and 
kills someone, nonhuman causes may be identified which contributed to that person’s 
death. If, however, the stone fell because someone pushed it, that person is a causal 
factor in the other person’s death. By analogy, if someone eats a poisonous substance 
that has been produced by non-preventable interbreeding of a plant with a wild 
relative, that substance may cause that person’s death. If, however, the substance has 
been created by humans, they are causally implicated in the death of the person eating 
it. Since Halford states that “no scientist will ever describe anything as completely 
safe” (2003, p. 81), the possibility exists that genetic modification might introduce a 
gene producing something that is not a “benign protein” (2003, p. 83). If this leads to 
someone’s death, unlike the situation where someone dies from eating a malign 
protein that was not produced by humans and not known to be malign, humans are 
causally implicated. There is a clear moral difference between the hypothetical 
scenarios, which is ignored by Halford. Prince Charles might be right that the 
question of whether or not genetic change is caused by humans is morally significant. 
My conclusion is that Halford’s three criticisms fail to challenge Prince Charles’ 
claim.            
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What the accounts presented above aim to do is to discredit the view of those 
who object to GM on the basis of its unnaturalness. All fail to mount a convincing 
critique. Nevertheless the belief that the “GM is unnatural” view is wrong is widely 
held. In an international study with “stakeholders” involved with GM (“the PABE 
study”), for example, data were gathered from interviews with stakeholders, analysis 
of documents written by them, and attendance of stakeholders’ meetings by 
researchers (Marris et al., 2001).4 It was found that “many promoters of GMOs (GM 
organisms) and scientists” hold the view that “the public thinks – wrongly – that 
GMOs are unnatural” and “insist on the idea that there is nothing fundamentally novel 
about recombinant DNA techniques” (Marris et al., 2001, pp. 83-84). In focus groups 
with ordinary citizens, the same study found that ordinary citizens frequently 
expressed the “GM is unnatural” view.5 While the same study acknowledges that 
those stakeholders who are identified as “anti-GMO lobbyists” shared this view, their 
views are not explored further (Marris et al., 2001, p. 84). Other research has found 
that the views of these “lobbyists” are usually referred to “in condemnatory terms” by 
                                                 
4
 The stakeholders came from five countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) 
and were “employees or spokespersons of any institution which plays a role in the creation, regulation, 
testing, and putting of (correction: on) the market of GMOs (GM organisms)” and anybody who 
expressed themselves “in public spheres” on GM (Marris et al., 2001, p. 26). A minimum of twenty 
open-ended in-depth interviews were held in each of the five countries. Participant observation 
consisted in researchers being present at stakeholder meetings and analysing the discourses used by 
stakeholders. The documents that were analysed were a number of documents written by stakeholder 
organisations. The PABE study also involved fifty-five focus groups on the subject with ordinary 
citizens from the five countries.     
5
 The “GM is unnatural” view was also held by many participants in a 1996-1997 study with nine focus 
groups involving UK citizens from a range of social groups (Grove-White et al., 1997; and see also 
Deane-Drummond et al., 2003, pp. 22-23). 
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those who reject the “GM is unnatural” view (Cook, 2004, p. 42). Scientists would 
know better and avoid “unnaturalness talk”, which would be emotional, understood in 
the sense of “irrational” or devoid of cognitive substance. The division of the debate 
between rational scientists, policy-advisors, and regulators on the one hand, and 
irrational others on the other hand, is suggested by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ 
claim that “few practising scientists can make much sense” of the “‘natural/unnatural’ 
distinction” (1999, p. 15 par. 1.40. See also e.g. p. 91 par. 5.38). A similar division is 
suggested by the other accounts under discussion. When the DEFRA Report talks of 
“people’s legitimate anxieties” and “legitimate ethical concerns”, these concerns are 
contrasted with the “significant potential benefits” which “GM crop technology could 
offer” (2004, p. 5, p. 7 Executive Summary 14, 25). This raises the question of 
whether the Government really thinks these “anxieties” are “legitimate”. My 
impression from reading their Report is that the answer to this question is negative, as 
the suggestion is made that risk assessment by scientists and regulators should 
convince us that a “ban” is not “the appropriate response” (2004, p. 15, par. 5.6). The 
possibility that some people may still have anxieties once the risks associated with a 
particular technology have been assessed to be low by scientists and regulators has 
been largely ignored (2004, p. 26, par. 5.54). Halford is less optimistic about the 
possibility of “scientists” curtailing the anxieties of “European consumers”, which 
would have been caused by their having “been bombarded with inaccurate 
information, half-truths, and wild scare-stories” by “anti-GM pressure groups” (2003, 
pp. 80-81).  
The general picture, then, appears to be one of a basic conflict between the 
rational people, including policy-makers, their advisors, and scientists, who reject the 
“GM is unnatural” view, and the irrational “non-scientists” who endorse it. But is it 
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really so simple? It might be asked if those scientists who are not actively involved in 
the GM debate also believe that the “GM is unnatural” view is wrong.6  
 
SCIENTISTS AND NON-SCIENTISTS TALKING ABOUT GM 
 
We recently had the opportunity to examine the views of a small group of scientists 
who were not GM specialists as part of a novel public engagement exercise.7 Our 
study involved twelve participants. Six of the participants were academic scientists 
working at the University of Newcastle. The other six participants were non-scientists 
living in one of three wards within the city. The scientists were recruited using an e-
mail to an existing university mailbase for academics with a research interest in the 
environment. The non-scientists were recruited through community groups and from a 
direct mailing to one hundred names randomly selected from the electoral register.  
Most participants took part in six facilitated one-to-one conversations or 
“exchanges” (of up to an hour) over a period of six months. Each conversation was 
with a different member of the other group – so each member of the public met each 
scientist once. The six rounds of exchanges were on six different topics: local 
environment; genetic modification; climate change; energy; biodiversity and animals; 
and land use and the countryside. Participants were not asked to prepare for the 
                                                 
6
 Previous research based on interviews with “thirteen UK scientists who had made public statements 
supporting or criticizing GM technology” found that scientists’ views on GM are by no means uniform, 
yet that “policy makers and regulators … tend to discount diversity among the views of scientists” 
(Scott and Carr, 2003, p. 352, p. 349).      
7
 The “Deliberating the Environment” study was carried out during 2003-2004 by Derek Bell, Tim 
Gray, Mary Brennan, Nicola Thompson, and Jan Deckers, and funded by the “Science in Society 
Programme” of the ESRC. 
 14 
exchanges. The facilitator’s role in the exchanges was to promote conversation 
between the participants. The participants were encouraged at the beginning of the 
exchanges to talk to each other and ask each other questions. We were very happy to 
begin the session with a single question and allow the participants to set their own 
agenda for the remainder of the exchange. However, the facilitator had a schedule of 
questions and a selection of materials, such as short newspaper articles, maps, pictures 
and quotations, which she could use to prompt further discussion between 
participants. Therefore, the exchanges were able to (and did) vary between two 
extremes: participant controlled (unstructured by the facilitator) and facilitator 
controlled (participants acted more like respondents in a semi-structured interview). 
In most exchanges, the facilitator’s prompts provided a loose framework for 
discussion between the participants. Before the first exchange and after the final 
exchange, we conducted semi-structured individual interviews with all of the 
participants. The interviews and exchanges were recorded and transcribed for 
analysis. 
The small number of participants in the study makes generalisation to a wider 
population difficult. However, we believe that looking in detail at the views of our 
participants may be fruitful in developing more satisfactory interpretations and 
explanations of views that are commonly held, such as the “GM is unnatural” view 
and the critical response to it. In this paper, I focus on the five exchanges on GM and, 
in particular, on whether the participants regarded GM as unnatural.8 However, where 
it may contribute to our understanding, I also draw on views expressed by the 
participants in their initial interviews, in which we asked them what they understood 
by the concept of “nature”. In what follows, I use pseudonyms to refer to the 
                                                 
8
 One of the six planned exchanges on GM did not take place. 
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participants. For ease of reference, the scientists have been given names beginning 
with the letters A to E (Alice, Brian, Craig, David, and Eric) and the non-scientists 
names beginning G to K (Gail, Henry, Irene, Jane and Keith). Their conversations 
provided us with a good opportunity to examine three issues: (i) whether our scientists 
shared the views of “many promoters of GMOs and scientists” in the PABE study on 
the “GM is unnatural” issue; (ii) whether the non-scientists expressed the “GM is 
unnatural” view, or identified themselves, through speaking with scientists, with what 
Wynne has called the “prescriptive ontologies of human relations, human subjects and 
society” (2001, p. 479) which are tacitly embodied in conventional “scientific” 
approaches, and which might inhibit the expression of the “GM is unnatural” view; 
and (iii) how the debate on GM might benefit from these exchanges. 
We found that three scientists rejected the “GM is unnatural” view. One, 
however, strongly endorsed it, and one was more ambivalent. All of the non-scientists 
apart from one expressed the view that GM is unnatural. The one non-scientist who 
did not accept the “GM is unnatural” view expressed agreement with her scientist 
exchange partner.9 Before addressing the non-scientists’ views, I shall first examine 
the issue of why some scientists rejected the “GM is unnatural” view in an attempt to 
throw more light on the view that the concerns of those who have objections to GM 
because of its unnaturalness are misplaced. The positions of Eric and Craig are 
presented as case studies of different perspectives on this view. 
 
WHY DO SCIENTISTS REJECT THE “GM IS UNNATURAL” VIEW? 
                                                 
9
 While Irene did not reject the “GM is unnatural” view explicitly, she did say, when Eric said that 
genes are being manipulated by humans, that “they’ve always done that”, providing the examples of 
hybrid roses and fruit trees that are grafted. 
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Eric presented the clearest account of this view:  
“At the moment most people if you say genetic modification they think in terms of messing around 
with the genetic structures of plants and animals to produce all kinds of strange hybrid creatures and 
bizarre plants when it isn’t, it isn’t really like that. (…) It’s almost a form of accelerating what is 
normal genetic change that you produce through breeding say. (…) All of our different classes of dogs 
have arisen … because we’ve selectively bred so in many ways we’ve manipulated the genetics, we’ve 
taken advantage of spontaneous change in the gene. (…) So it is nothing especially new, we’ve always 
introduced new crops into old environments …we’ve always changed the landscape to accommodate 
… . None of our landscape is a natural landscape, it’s all been determined by new farming practices or 
bringing in new animals. (…) I don’t think Britain before the Romans came had cattle, dormice were 
still actively bred, we have, there are, we’ve always manipulated the environment in that way. (…) 
You’re going to the Middle East, you need more plants that will tolerate dry conditions, … or colder 
conditions, all of those are potential benefits of genetic manipulation.”  
While Eric suggested “the natural” could not be differentiated from “the unnatural” in 
his first interview, the concept of “naturalness” appears to make sense in the above 
quote. Presumably, it was understood in terms of a “landscape” that has not been 
changed by human interference. He then proceeded by pointing out that humans have 
interfered with nature for a long time. This seems to be the reason why GM was 
perceived to be just another technology which humans use to change their 
environment, like conventional breeding methods which preceded it. Since “what we 
perceive as nature in this country is largely man made” (a view also expressed in his 
first interview) the problem with those who hold the “GM is unnatural” view is that 
they fail to see that GM is “nothing especially new” as humans have always 
“manipulated the environment”.10 Yet Eric did not explain why he disagreed with the 
                                                 
10
 In the first interview, Eric understood by wilderness “an area which has never been deliberately or 
systematically manipulated by man”, and also that this “can’t be a definition of nature” because “it 
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views of “most people”, as no explanation was provided why GM would be different 
from producing “strange hybrid creatures and bizarre plants”. Since new organisms 
are produced by GM, what “most people” may mean when they call these organisms 
“strange” or “bizarre” is simply that they stand apart from organisms that have been 
produced in conventional ways. A further issue is whether the view that GM is 
“almost a form of accelerating what is normal genetic change” is sufficiently accurate 
as a scientific account of what is distinctive about GM, in view of the different 
methods that are used to produce genetic change. Eric may doubt the accuracy of this 
view himself, since the word “almost” is used, and the contrast made with what is 
called “normal genetic change” suggests that GM is different in kind.11  
The most interesting account of the view that GM is a normal extension of 
conventional breeding methods comes from Craig, not least because his account 
provides clues to why the view may be held by some scientists. When his non-
scientist exchange partner, Henry, said that he was against “anything which goes 
against nature”, Craig said that this was “not consistent”. Like Eric, Craig pointed out 
that GM may not be different from conventional ways of breeding, providing as an 
example the cross breeding of pigs and cattle which has been going on for hundreds 
of years. Craig also said that research had shown that there was no risk of GM 
material contaminating non-GM crops, and that using GM could be beneficial for 
biodiversity as it could lead to a reduction in the use of weed killers and pesticides, or 
the use of more benign forms of these. In spite of these claims, Craig clearly 
                                                                                                                                            
hardly exists anymore”. He also said that “what we perceive as nature in this country is largely man 
made”, which was contrasted with the wilderness “in Tasmania”. 
11
 The same uncertainty resounded in Alice’s words. Her phrase that “we’ve been manipulating the 
genetic make-up of things for a long time … it’s just doing it quickly” was followed by the words 
“isn’t it?”. 
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appreciated Henry’s position when Henry said he was against “anything which goes 
against nature”. Craig even admitted that this is what he would say “as a non-
scientist”. While Craig said that he did “not really” have specific concerns about GM 
(when the facilitator asked him), he also said that he was against it, a position which 
made him feel uncomfortable: “I think as a scientist or researcher to say OK I’m 
against it because I don’t like it … is very difficult”. When Craig put on his “scientific 
hat”, he could not accept the view of those who object to GM on the basis of its 
alleged unnaturalness. Yet when Craig took off his “scientific hat”, he found himself 
to be opposed to a technology without knowing or being able to articulate precisely 
why this might be the case. Perhaps, Craig believed that decisions about GM had to 
be based on more than strictly “scientific” issues, yet he felt at the same time that he 
had to discredit this belief when he put on his “scientific hat”. In spite of the fact that 
Craig recognised that capitalist motives might be a strong driving force behind the 
development of GM, his belief in scientists was unshakable. When he was asked if 
scientists could be trusted to carry out research on GM, he said that this should be a 
basic premise, continuing: “we scientists are to find the truth … so … I totally say yes 
you have to trust them”. Henry, by contrast, qualified his faith in scientists by saying 
that he trusted them as long as “they don’t try to interfere too much (and) don’t try to 
play God”, and thought scientists might be doing this by “embryo cloning”. While 
Henry provided Craig with opportunities to qualify his faith in scientists, he did not 
do so. And while Henry expressed doubt about the validity of the Farm Scale 
Evaluations on several occasions, Craig said he trusted Margaret Becket to make the 
right decisions based on them.12  
                                                 
12
 The Farm Scale Evaluations (“the trials”) are a range of investigations at field level which were 
undertaken in the UK on the basis of an agreement between the UK Government and SCIMAC (the 
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The reason why Craig could not reconcile his ultimately negative verdict 
about GM with his status as a scientist may relate to what has been identified (and 
challenged) as the reductionist worldview of what counts as “‘scientific”. It comprises 
three basic tenets. The first tenet is the belief that risk assessment is a scientific 
activity, and that the issue of what defines as a “risk” is unproblematic. The views on 
risks held by the “non-expert” world are treated as “epistemically vacuous” (Wynne, 
1996, p. 61). The second tenet is the belief that science can, in principle, account for 
all the risks and benefits that may be associated with a particular technology. 
Uncertainties are understood predominantly in terms of calculable probabilities and 
temporary setbacks. The final tenet is the belief that new technologies are not 
significantly different from old ones. The negative effects of these old technologies 
are either ignored or downplayed, and the new technologies presented as the next 
stage of “progress”. Associated with this is the belief that “the public” are always 
suspicious about new technologies initially, yet soon come to realise that their 
suspicion is misplaced (Levidow, 2001; Wynne, 1996 & 2001 & 2003). Taken 
together, these tenets amount to the view that the nonhuman world must be reduced to 
a collection of objects for human control, and that the only limits to objectifying the 
world to human control are temporary scientific uncertainties. As a “scientist” Craig 
appeared to be committed to the reductionist worldview but as a “non-scientist” his 
worldview was rather different. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Supply Chain Initiative on Modified Agricultural Crops), the organisation which represents the 
agricultural and biotechnology industry. They were held between 1999 and 2003 and involved four GM 
herbicide-tolerant crops: winter and spring varieties of oilseed rape, beet (fodder and sugar), and forage 
maize.  
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WHY DO SCIENTISTS HOLD THE “GM IS UNNATURAL” VIEW? 
 
While Craig could not make sense of the “GM is unnatural” view “as a scientist”, a 
position which he shared with two other scientists, one of our participants was a 
scientist who endorsed this view strongly, without seeing it as conflicting with 
science. Little is known about the views of scientists who embrace the view that GM 
is unnatural, as many scientists who have either written or been interviewed on GM 
share the Nuffield Council’s position that the “‘natural/unnatural’ distinction is one of 
which few practising scientists can make much sense” (1999, p. 15 par. 1.40). Brian’s 
account provided us with data for a rare case study of a scientist who thought that GM 
is unnatural. My discussion of his view is supplemented by comparison with the 
views expressed by the non-scientists in our study. The non-scientists shared many of 
Brian’s concerns. 
Brian expressed concerns related to the process, the outcome, and the attitudes 
of the researchers involved with GM. Firstly, if we focus on the process of genetic 
modification, Brian thought genetic modification involves “faffing round directly with 
the genes” or “messing round”, which he valued negatively. GM was regarded as 
“qualitative(ly)” different from conventional breeding methods. Brian contrasted 
“technology” with “nature” in his first interview. By “nature”, he understood “the 
mountains and the woods and … the sea”. This was contrasted with “what the journal 
Nature would think of”, which would be “molecular biology”. Brian was not opposed 
to “high tech” per se, yet he thought that it could distract us from understanding what 
really goes on in nature. Brian may have thought of GM as a “high tech” approach, 
while he thought of conventional breeding methods as less “high tech”. A similar 
theme was expressed by one of the non-scientists, Keith. However, while Brian spoke 
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of a “qualitative difference” between conventional (selective) breeding and GM, 
Keith contrasted natural selection with GM and said that the latter is “mucking around 
with the genes”. 
Secondly, if we now focus on the outcomes of GM, Brian was clearly 
concerned about its potentially negative effects. In his first interview, Brian explained 
that one of the reasons for his relative lack of interest in “high tech” was the idea that 
we do not understand nature enough to manage it: “I think that our understanding of 
the natural world is so poor that … high tech doesn’t even come on the scale”. Brian 
perceived GM as problematic because of its potential to make far-reaching changes in 
a poorly understood natural world. The use of GM technologies was perceived as a 
threat to the preservation of “a proper natural stock”. This was expressed as follows: 
“the sort of … fear is that if you’ve got transgenic pollen as they call it, it’s been 
altered. That … it’s going to mix with natural stock … and then you’re never going to 
have a proper natural stock anymore. There’s always going to be, it’s going to be 
adulterated with this stuff that we’ve faffed around with”. Another of the non-
scientists, Jane, was also concerned with preserving “a nucleus of this good thing … 
what we’ve got”. Yet she showed a greater readiness than Brian to welcome some 
applications, saying that “if they keep things to themselves like corn to make it shorter 
or fatter, that’s alright”. At the same time, she was “terrified” of shifting genes 
between organisms that are more distantly related, imagining a bird eating from a 
plant modified with something from a fish and “growing teeth like the shark it came 
from”. 
Thirdly, and related to the previous point, Brian was concerned that GM 
scientists might be overconfident in their knowledge claims, and that this might lead 
to negative outcomes. This was articulated partly in terms of the question of whether 
 22 
enough research had been done to make decisions about whether or not GM 
technologies should be used. Brian expressed this concern when he was asked to 
comment on the Farm Scale Evaluations. After saying that he had heard about them, 
yet that he did not know much about them, he said that he doubted their 
“comprehensiveness” and that “one field trial of anything is not enough to base a 
decision on”.13 Yet a more fundamental concern was expressed as follows:  
“There’s the people who are the staunchest advocates of it, are keen to point out that we’ve always … 
selectively bred things, to manipulate the gene pool, and to get a desired end result … , you look at the 
variety of dogs there are … we’ve deliberately selected and bred dogs with specific characteristics ‘til 
they end up with these phenomenal array of races within the same species … just for our amusement 
really, and they go on to say well what’s the difference, in selecting genes like that and the way they’ve 
done it with agriculture … cows apparently couldn’t live wild anymore … cause we’ve bred and bred 
them, and interbred them until they’re dependent on the farming system, and … well then the argument 
is … why can’t you directly alter the genotype in order to get things to do what we want them to do. 
Erm, my feeling is that there is a qualitative difference in those two approaches inasmuch as if you’re 
faffing round directly with the genes … you’re basically working on an assumption that you can … 
accurately predict the consequences of messing round at that level … with a fair degree of certainty, or 
with absolute certainty is what they tend to project when they’re talking about it in public. And I have 
to say that in every other sphere of science I’ve worked in, we don’t work with that level of certainty 
… That’s my biggest concern … that they present things in utterly cause and effect language which in 
all other spheres of science is largely debunked, and we tend to talk in terms of probabilistic outcomes, 
and I think there’s much more probability about it than these people want to admit. I don’t see why it 
                                                 
13
 A similar concern was expressed by many participants from a range of social and professional 
backgrounds in a study with a range of focus groups in central Michigan on the issue of plant 
biotechnology and GM foods. The study reports that “many participants … expressed concern that 
insufficient testing was sometimes occurring prior to product approval” (Beckwith et al., 2003, p. 102). 
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should be the only area of science that isn’t subject to uncertainty … I think it’s less predictable … than 
the staunch advocates would like you to believe.”14  
What Brian expressed in these words is the view that either “the staunch advocates” 
of GM (or, perhaps, all GM scientists) differ from those who use conventional 
breeding methods and other scientists because they deny the possibility that uncertain 
consequences might result from genetic modification. Yet any scientific theory must 
be falsifiable, and its advocates must be open to the possibility that consequences 
might turn out to be different from what was predicted, thereby challenging the 
theory. Both GM and non-GM scientists should share this understanding of science. 
Why, therefore, would GM scientists deny the possibility that uncertain outcomes 
might be produced?  
One possibility is that they simply overestimate the degree to which humans 
can predict the outcomes of natural events. Yet it is hard to see why this tendency 
should be manifested more amongst GM scientists than amongst other scientists. 
Another interpretation is that (some) GM scientists might have such strong interests in 
pursuing “certain” outcomes that they downplay or deny the possibility that uncertain 
and undesirable consequences might follow. In the context of writing on GM, Guy 
Cook has pointed out that the distinction between science and technology has “in 
recent years … fallen by the wayside” (2004, p. 81). Cook has argued that the terms 
“GM” or “genetic modification” have contributed to the confusion as “the word 
‘modification’ (like its abandoned precursor, ‘engineering’) is inherently 
                                                 
14
 Several participants related these uncertainties to concerns about the spread of GM material to wild 
relatives or non-GM crops (in the words of David: “pollen could go miles” and “a bee doesn’t know 
the farm edge”), the development of herbicide-resistant weeds, and biodiversity loss. These concerns 
were found also amongst those who regarded GM as a normal extension from conventional breeding 
techniques. 
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technological rather than scientific, referring to an activity rather than a field of 
knowledge” (2004, p. 82). A plausible interpretation of Brian’s views is that, while he 
was generally concerned about GM because of the process and its outcomes, he was 
especially concerned by those whom he perceived as denying the possibility that 
uncertain consequences might be produced by their actions. The commercial interests 
which the “staunch advocates” may have might undermine the scientific ideal of 
knowledge pursuit as a disinterested activity, and explain why some might claim to 
know the consequences “with absolute certainty … when they’re talking about it in 
public”.15 Brian expressed his distrust of the motives of GM companies when he 
contested the claim that GM was a technology that would help the poor: “no amount 
of technological change will change injustice … if Monsanto wanted to save the Third 
World it could always wind up its business and donate its proceeds to charity.” 
Brian’s three concerns are clearly related. For him, and for four of our non-
scientists, GM is unnatural because it is a technology that does not work with, but 
against nature. The natural order was understood as possessing its own teleology, and 
GM was perceived as an over-confident attempt to subject nonhuman nature to the 
external teleology imposed on it by humans, which would then be “adulterated”. 
Accepting the natural order and preserving its integrity were perceived as, prima 
facie, right. Attempts to change the natural order in radical ways (which GM was 
perceived to be doing) were perceived as failures to accept the natural order, and 
therefore, prima facie, as wrong. The general feeling was that there was wisdom 
within nature which could be trusted. An example is Brian’s remark that he saw “no 
case” for genetically modifying bacteria “to destroy the acidity of polluted mine 
                                                 
15
 Most participants thought that commerce and greed might be powerful driving forces behind GM 
technology. 
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waters” as “the natural bacteria … are absolutely fantastic”. His exchange partner, 
Keith, agreed that “nature has it right in the first place”. The question of whether or 
not we should develop and use GM was associated with a choice between two 
worldviews. The first view was that natural things possess their own purposiveness, 
which should be, by and large, left intact by humans. The second view was that 
natural things either are devoid of purposes, yet can be rendered with purposiveness 
by humans, or have their own purposiveness, yet that these purposes may legitimately 
be replaced with new purposes given to them by humans.16 The statements of Brian 
and the non-scientists who supported the “GM is unnatural” view can be interpreted 
as expressions of agreement with the former worldview. Perhaps, the clearest example 
can be found in Brian’s answer to the question of what he thought about modifying 
pets so that their fur won’t cause allergies: “I think that’s outrageous.”  
The main concern about GM scientists was that their attempts to alter nature to 
accommodate it to human needs were perceived as “mucking around with nature”, 
“faffing around with genes”, “messing with nature”, in other words as, prima facie, 
arrogant. This is also how the fear of Henry, who said that he was an atheist, has to be 
understood, when he said that he feared that scientists involved in GM may be trying 
                                                 
16
 The philosophers McKibben, Raffensperger, and Sandler have expressed similar reservations about 
GM as the participants in our study who thought GM was unnatural. The disposition to manipulate and 
dominate nature is opposed to the disposition to adapt ourselves to nature (McKibben, 1999, p. 150 and 
Raffensperger, 2002, p. 133 and Sandler, 2004). Words like “arrogance” and “hubris” are used to 
characterise the former disposition, while the latter disposition is described as expressive of “humility”. 
Sandler has pointed out that humility is not justified simply out of fear of the likely consequences for 
humans and others that might result from dispositions which exhibit arrogance towards nature, yet that 
it “is justified by a proper understanding of ourselves and our relationship with the natural environment 
– an understanding that is significantly informed by the results of our past decisions” (2004, 309). 
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to “play God”.17 Even Alice, who showed a great deal of support for GM, recognised 
this as a concern. In the context of discussing the views religious people might have 
about GM, she remarked that GM is “kind of imposing our will over … life in 
general”, adding that she thought “quite a number of religions” would be against 
“changing life purposely”. It is notable that this perception was shared by many 
participants in eight structured focus groups with a selection of population groups in 
the UK, held in 2001, on the genetic modification of animals. Commenting on 
participants’ views, Macnaghten summarises: “Plants and animals had evolved over 
millenia and to propose that one could ‘improve’ characteristics on a more or less 
‘instantaneous’ basis appeared to some respondents as arrogant, as hubris and as 
likely to rebound on humans. The principles of ‘letting be’ and the sensed need for 
‘humility’ appear to be powerfully endorsed in the discussions” (2004, p. 546).  
 
DOES THE “GM IS UNNATURAL” VIEW EXCLUDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR 
GM?    
 
So far, I have argued that Brian and four of the five non-scientists in our study 
endorsed the “GM is unnatural” view. I have suggested that the view was not only 
multi-faceted but also underpinned by an implicit worldview. The account presented 
may have created the impression that those who held the “GM is unnatural” view 
rejected all GM applications. This was not the case. They did not subscribe to a 
simplistic “nature knows best” ideology, which would question all human attempts to 
                                                 
17
 This is exactly what is claimed by one scientist in the context of defending genomics: “The fact is 
that we will have a power almost godlike” (Gee, 2001, p. 14 as quoted by Hendry, 2002, p. 188). 
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influence natural processes.18 Neither did we find support for Alison Shaw’s 
interpretation of the views of ordinary UK citizens recruited from a variety of 
community groups (and interviewed on GM), namely that they held a rather 
romanticised picture of nature, with nature being regarded as fundamentally good and 
human intervention as inherently bad (2002). All participants felt that some 
interventions were justifiable, while others were not. Opponents of GM combined a 
general stance of being “against” GM with support for particular applications. How, 
then, can we reconcile the apparent conflict between general statements of 
disapproval with limited support for some applications? Put differently, does the sheer 
fact that those who expressed the “GM is unnatural” view embraced some GM 
applications not undermine the credibility of the “GM is unnatural” view? 
To answer this question, we must consider which applications participants had 
in mind when they said that GM was wrong because of its unnaturalness. Most of 
them thought of agricultural applications, mainly herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape and 
maize. Other GM applications were less well-known. Yet when participants were 
asked to evaluate some other applications introduced by the facilitator, some were 
evaluated positively. The production of GM insulin for diabetics, for example, was 
evaluated positively by all participants. Brian approved also, with some reservations, 
of the production of transgenic pigs and the use of their organs by humans: “I suppose 
                                                 
18
 Yet this is what some scientists seem to claim some non-scientists subscribe to. Gee, for example, 
writes, in the context of defending genomics, that “a sensible political strategy … must … not be 
overly swayed by the wilfully ill-informed-ban-everything mentality of those who wish to retrieve a 
golden age that never was” and that “the concerns of the anti-GM lobby … are distracting” (Gee, 2001, 
p. 14 as quoted by Hendry, 2002, p. 88). A weaker account is presented by Halford, who reacts against 
“the popular notion that ‘natural’ is good and man-made is ‘bad’ when it comes to food” (Halford, 
2003, p. 13). 
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if I was desperate for a heart … I’d be prepared to overlook” animal welfare 
considerations. The data do not support the interpretation that participants felt they 
had to give up the “GM is unnatural” view once they were asked or told about GM 
applications which they felt they needed to support. Instead, they felt that GM was 
still unnatural, but that the wrongness of doing something that was perceived to be 
unnatural was outweighed by the benefits which could be derived. For example, with 
GM insulin, benefits were perceived for diabetics as they depend on an adequate 
supply of good quality insulin. Another relevant consideration was that the insulin-
producing bacteria were perceived to be able to be confined to the lab, unlike many 
other applications. All felt that when a serious human need could be met by a 
particular GM application, and when there were either no alternatives or when 
alternatives were perceived to be more problematic, the negative value of doing 
something unnatural would be outweighed by the positive benefits. Participants varied 
somewhat, though, in which applications they were prepared to give their seal of 
approval. Because they could not see any serious benefits that might be derived from 
the production of GM herbicide-tolerant maize and soya, many disapproved of their 
commercialisation. In these cases, the wrongness of doing something unnatural was 
not outweighed by what were perceived to be dubious claims about potential benefits. 
GM was perceived as an illegitimate infringement of humans on the natural order, 
unless participants thought that serious human needs could be satisfied by changing 
the natural order through GM, and when these needs could not be satisfied by less 
problematic means. Sandler has interpreted such a position as follows: “Humility … 
is one virtue among many, and on some occasions the course of action favored by one 
virtue is appropriately subordinated to the course of action favored by others” (2004, 
p. 310). A better interpretation of the views of our participants is not that they 
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subordinated the virtue of humility to some other virtue when they showed support for 
a particular application, such as the production of GM insulin. GM was not 
intrinsically linked with a lack of humility. It was only linked with a lack of humility 
if it was perceived as being done for the wrong reasons.  
 
WIDER UNEASE WITH MODERN FARMING PRACTICES, OTHER 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND A WHOLE WAY OF BEING  
 
As I have indicated, the reason why those who expressed the “GM is unnatural” view 
had negative perceptions about some, yet not all genetic applications, did not relate to 
a concern with genetic modification as such. Instead, their concerns were related to an 
underlying worldview, which they held to be problematic, and of which they thought 
some genetic applications were expressions. Therefore, it is not surprising that they 
frequently connected GM with different manifestations of this worldview, which they 
questioned also. Their views suggested that there are varying degrees of 
unnaturalness, depending on the different methods that humans can use to interfere 
with nature. While participants frequently struggled to define the word “nature” when 
they were asked to do so in their first interview, the lack of a clear definition did not 
deter them from using the words “nature”, “natural” and “unnatural”. How they 
understood these words has been articulated well by Cook: “Neither ‘natural’ nor 
‘unnatural’ can be defined by a checklist of necessary features, but that is not to say 
that they have no meaning. They are words best understood by reference to 
prototypical instances. It makes sense to talk of degrees of naturalness, and to place 
different phenomena at different points along a continuum. Thus a plant growing in a 
wilderness is prototypically natural; a GM plant growing in a laboratory is 
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considerably less so” (2004, p. 99 and pp. 82-84). Many participants placed various 
technologies and practices somewhere on a continuum between naturalness and 
unnaturalness, and expressed more concern about those that were placed closer to the 
unnatural end of the spectrum. What is more, those participants who questioned the 
“GM is unnatural” view frequently questioned the same technologies and practices. In 
other words, they had common concerns that may reflect a similar worldview, but one 
that was repressed in discussions of GM. 
  One area of wider unease was particular farming practices of which some GM 
applications were perceived as being a part. In the exchange between Henry and 
Craig, Henry brought up issues of wider concern with farming practices. First of all, 
Henry answered the question of what he understood by GM and what he thought of it 
as follows: “I’m just dead against it, as I said before I was brought up on farms in the 
old fashioned manure on the fields and things. I think it’s wrong to mix things up, it’s 
going against nature … It’s just strong feelings. I’m anti GM, I don’t know what 
mutants is, but I’m anti.” While his concern that it may be “wrong to mix things up” 
resembles Brian’s concern about keeping “a proper natural stock”, when Henry was 
then asked by Craig if he opposed the breeding of cattle by conventional means, 
Henry’s response indicates that his concern about GM was part of a wider unease with 
some modern farming methods which he deemed to be unnatural, and therefore 
morally problematic. Henry used the following words: “I’m against these … factory 
farms for the hens and things like that, conditions for pigs … just chained up all the 
time, or in little cages, it’s not nature, it’s not natural … it’s just for breeding purposes 
or food purposes really … you get these fat hens and fat cows and things and pigs, it’s 
cruelty as far as I’m concerned.” The connection between genetic modification and 
factory farming is that Henry perceived both to be products of the same philosophy of 
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strong anthropocentrism, an approach that conceives of the value of the nonhuman 
world primarily in terms of its use value for humans.19 Henry questioned this 
approach not only because of the cruelty it inflicts on nonhuman animals, yet also 
because of the unease he felt with an approach that he perceived as going too far in 
instrumentalising the nonhuman world to human purposes. Henry’s concern with 
practices that reduce the value of parts of the nonhuman world to their value for 
human “food purposes” was also expressed by Eric, the scientist who most clearly 
rejected the “GM is unnatural” view. Eric spoke negatively about some practices 
which were perceived to reduce the aesthetic value of the environment and the value 
of the environment for nonhuman animals. While he thought that a potential benefit of 
GM crops that are tolerant to broad-spectrum herbicides may be higher yields or 
cleaner crops that are easier to harvest, he said that he preferred to eat products from 
fields which had provided food for (nonhuman) animals at the same time, even if the 
quality of the food would be worse. Eric associated negative perceptions (including, 
for example, that the absence of barriers in monocultures could facilitate the spread of 
disease) with “complete monoculture system(s)” and areas that are “completely 
lifeless”, providing the example of maize fields he had seen in America: “the thought 
of that being an almost sterile environment, … it’s pretty boring”.  
The right way forward, for Henry, was to develop organic farming, which was 
also supported strongly by Craig. Henry connected organic farming to the way he was 
brought up, which he connected with “nature” and “cleaning the byres out and … 
spreading it onto fields and things like that”, and which he held to be “a healthier 
world”. What Henry seemed to express is the view that farming is about more than 
producing goods for the market.  It is also about a whole way of being; a personal way 
                                                 
19
 For a more elaborate account of strong anthropocentrism, see Deckers, 2004. 
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of relating to the environment. The suggestion is that the value of relating to farm 
animals (whilst “cleaning the byres out”) and to the wider environment in a personal 
way is threatened by modern farming methods.20 Recently, Verhoog and others have 
argued that there is a justifiable connection between “naturalness” and organic 
farming, and even that the concept of “naturalness” can be used to distinguish organic 
agriculture from conventional agriculture. They hold that organic farming is “closer to 
nature” (2003, p. 46) if it involves more than not using synthetic inorganic substances 
from the conviction that organic food is healthier, and also includes two further 
components. The first one is what is called an “agro-ecological approach”, which 
regards self-regulation and integration of agricultural activities into nature as 
important principles (opposing the tendency of conventional farming to increase 
human independence of nature). The emphasis would be on working with nature 
rather than fighting against it, and on preventing problems through increasing our 
knowledge of ecological processes. The second component is what is called the 
“integrity approach”, which assigns great importance to the value of respect for life 
and to conceiving of “natural entities as partners of humans”. On this approach, what 
is natural refers to “taking into account the characteristic nature of plants, animals, 
and ecosystems because nature has intrinsic value” and to “an inner process of 
involvement with the way of being of natural entities” (2003, pp. 43-44). 
The reason why many participants were wary about GM related to the feeling 
that those who drive GM, and many other technological innovations, are so strongly 
                                                 
20
 Interestingly, those who participated in two citizens’ juries (in Hertfordshire and Tyneside) that 
deliberated on GM crops in the summer of 2003 also associated positive values with organic farming 
and wanted more support for it, and the Tyneside Jury shared with Henry a concern about animal 
welfare and a concern that GM might destroy the positive relations that exist between farmers and their 
land (Policy Ethics and Life Sciences Research Institute, 2003, p. 2, p. 10, p. 16). 
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committed to the philosophy of subjecting the nonhuman world to human ends that 
they underestimate the risks involved or downplay them. They were also concerned 
that the innovators defined risks and benefits primarily in terms of short-term profit 
and yield (for humans) and failed to take into account the long-term risks, including 
the risks involved for nonhuman life.21 For example, Henry’s response to Craig’s 
claim that “there were studies … which show that … pollen cross contamination … 
will not happen” was: “Looks good on paper but will it really work? … I’m doubtful”. 
As many participants’ distrust related to the attitudes and motivations of the 
innovators rather than to the technologies themselves, more information could not 
restore their lack of confidence. A good example came up in the exchange between 
Craig and Henry. When Craig said that Henry “should be in favour of GM food 
because with GM food you could use less … weed killers or pesticides”, Henry 
replied: “Yeah but they’re stronger weed killers, aren’t they, … they’ll have an 
                                                 
21
 David, for example, said that Monsanto had sold more weedkiller in Canada, yet that the crops had 
not become any bigger. Donald Bruce provides another example of such a conflict between the 
respective values of promoters and others. When Monsanto planned the introduction of GM soya from 
the USA into Britain in the 1990s, they did not consider labelling to be necessary given the product had 
met the regulatory requirements. In this way, the possibility that the British public might perceive risks 
where Monsanto could see none was ignored, as well as the possibility that the public might 
incorporate notions in their definition of risk that went beyond the question of whether or not GM soya 
was “substantially equivalent” with non-GM soya, for example concerns with biodiversity (2002, 76-
77). Further, in a series of interviews with lay people in the UK, Shaw also found that experts were 
perceived to be failing to take into account the long-term environmental and health impacts (2002). 
This view might have been shared by participants in two citizens’ juries (in Hertfordshire and 
Tyneside) that deliberated on GM crops in the summer of 2003 as they called for long-term studies to 
assess the potential for harm from the cultivation of GM crops (Policy Ethics and Life Sciences 
Research Institute, 2003, p. 1). 
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adverse effect on natural animal life.” He also countered Craig’s suggestion by saying 
that pollen could spread into the wild and on the fields of farmers who would not want 
it. Henry admitted that he did not know much about the technology as such, yet he 
was convinced that the use of broad-spectrum herbicides applied to GM crops could 
lead to animals being “poisoned”, and made a connection with some consequences 
that have resulted from conventional farming methods: “there’s a lot of birdlife 
disappeared from what I can see … When I’m walking around, to what it used to be 
when I were … as a kid, there was any amount of birds, and they are getting less and 
less. Even the common house sparrow’s getting less.” 
Many other references were made to things that had gone wrong in the past to 
express distrust in those who develop, use, and regulate technological innovations. 
Gail, for example, related her doubt about whether the potential consequences of GM 
could be predicted with sufficient accuracy to her perception that people had changed 
their views about insecticides after a re-evaluation of their effects: “Cause it’s 
happened with other things hasn’t it when they’ve got rid of insects that have attacked 
vegetables and the thing that they put in to get rid of  … turns out to be worse than the 
problem you already had.” This is why she said that she found it “hard to believe” the 
scientists involved with GM, “because so many things are put forward to the general 
public that it’s good for you and then a few years down the line it’s not so good” 
(providing also the example of cigarettes). This theme was picked up on by, her 
exchange partner, Alice. While Alice did not express a lack of faith in scientists, she 
did express a concern with “cascading effect(s)”, in particular with bad effects 
resulting from something intended to be good, which made her question what happens 
“to the plant (and) the things that feed on the insect” when insect-resistant plants are 
created. Irene, the non-scientist who was least supportive of the “GM is unnatural” 
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view, provided another example by relating her fear that GM crops might lead to a 
reduction of interest in crop rotation, which she valued positively, to losses of top soil 
that have occurred in the past. She referred to “what happened in America with the 
cotton and the dustbowl … well they grew cotton and cotton and cotton and then in 
the end they couldn’t grow anything … leached everything out of the soil”. She even 
“wonder(ed) what happened to the desert (…) you read about in the Bible and how it 
was all lush and green and now it’s under the sand”. The underlying concern was that 
some events (such as desertification) which humans might not normally hold 
themselves to be responsible for, might nevertheless have been produced by humans. 
The message for promoters of technological innovations is clear: we must be careful 
not to underestimate the impact which humans have on their environments.  
While the focus in what precedes has been on the perception that GM and 
other farming methods were problematic because they were perceived to be 
embedding the wrong values, this wider unease with modern technologies and 
practices was by no means restricted to farming methods. Another example of this 
wider unease is the fact that some participants connected GM with cloning, which was 
perceived negatively.22 Like the scientists involved with GM, those involved with 
cloning were perceived as having an inadequate understanding of what is acceptable. 
This was also found in the PABE study, which reported that members of the public 
frequently mentioned cloning alongside GM, and interpreted this as a sign of both 
being”‘considered to be part of the same technological trajectory” (Marris et al., 2001, 
p. 59). Eric made another connection. In spite of the fact that he said, cautiously, that 
                                                 
22
 In a range of open interviews with people in Germany, held between 1995 and 1997, the cloning of 
human beings was also often mentioned by participants when they were asked to speak about genetic 
engineering. It was evaluated very negatively (Zwick, 2000, p. 275).  
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transplanting hearts from transgenic pigs into humans might be acceptable, he 
questioned his approval in the following way: “the ethical issue is whether you should 
genetically manipulate a pig, or something like that specifically to produce a heart … 
so that the pig can be killed and the heart can be taken out … we forget the fact that 
we kill animals”. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the underlying unease with GM was not related to GM as such, yet to a 
particular approach to nature which was thought to be problematic, we have to cast 
serious doubt over the widely held view, especially by stakeholders in the GM debate, 
that people would be more supportive of GM if only they knew more about genetics 
(e.g. Halford, 2003, p. vi, pp. 80-81 and Simon, 2003, p. 6, p. 25 and Annerberg, 
2003, pp. 17-18 and Dale, 2003, p. 21 and Shaw, 1999, 12.1, 12.2, and 13.4).23 In fact, 
the GM Nation study found that people developed “harder … attitudes and more 
intense … concerns” about GM the more they engaged with the issues (GM Public 
Debate Steering Board, 2003, p. 51). While the seventy-seven participants in the 
“narrow-but-deep sample” (who participated in ten closed discussion groups 
representing a cross-section of members of the UK public and acted as a control on 
the self-selecting participants in the open debate) became more accepting of some 
applications, including some medical benefits and potential advantages of GM crops 
for developing countries, they became less willing to accept other GM applications 
                                                 
23
 Similar criticisms of this view have been expressed in other studies. See for example Marris et al., 
2001, pp. 79-80; Rogers-Hayden & Campbell, 2003, p. 528; Shaw, 2002, p. 278; Madsen et al., 2002, 
p. 66; Beckwith et al., 2003, pp. 105-106 (yet see also p. 108 for a different perspective).  
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and expressed more concerns about all the identified risks (2003, pp. 42-44). Also, in 
a range of in-depth interviews with ordinary UK citizens, Shaw found that the most 
highly informed expressed the most opposition to GM (2002, p. 278).  
The findings of our study are that some (especially, yet not exclusively) 
scientists claim that GM is a normal extension from conventional breeding methods. 
They have a problem with the view that GM is unnatural because of the difficulty to 
differentiate what is natural from what is unnatural. However, some scientists, such as 
Brian, endorse the “GM is unnatural” view, while even those who reject it, such as 
Eric, frequently have an unacknowledged understanding that there is a difference 
between the “natural” and the “unnatural”. The claims of those who subscribe to the 
“GM is unnatural” view are often dismissed, yet an examination of this position 
reveals that there are many concerns which are shared by both its adherents and its 
critics. These concerns, however, are belittled and repressed by those who subscribe 
to a reductionist “scientific” worldview. Eric and Craig felt uncomfortable, even torn, 
between this worldview and the worldview underlying the “GM is unnatural” view. 
However, almost all participants also recognised that some GM applications might be 
acceptable because of the clear benefits involved. Given the importance which many 
participants attach to the fundamental question of which place humans should occupy 
within nature, the hostility which many scientists, policy advisors, and policy-makers 
have shown towards the “GM is unnatural” position must be regretted, precisely 
because the underlying anthropological and ethical issues of the “scientific” 
worldview are problematised by this view. Halford has suggested that “genetic 
modification … is no longer a new technology” and that “eventually the debating has 
to stop, conclusions have to be drawn and decisions made” (2003, p. 104). Precisely 
because many scientists, policy advisors, and policy-makers fail to listen to and 
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misrepresent the concerns of those who problematise the worldview that underlies 
GM and other technologies, my hope is that the debate may continue and that, for 
some, it may start.24 
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